

## Fund description and summary of investment policy

The Fund invests in a mix of absolute return funds managed by Allan Gray's offshore investment partner, Orbis Investment Management Limited. The typical net equity exposure of the Fund is between 0% and 20%. The Orbis Optimal SA funds included in the Fund use exchange-traded derivative contracts on stock market indices to reduce net equity exposure. In these funds, the market exposure of equity portfolios is effectively replaced with cash-like exposure, plus or minus Orbis' skills in delivering returns above or below the market. Returns are likely to be less volatile than those of a foreign equity or balanced fund. Although the Fund is fully invested outside South Africa, the units in the Fund are priced and traded daily in rands. When considered in rands, returns of this foreign fund are likely to be more volatile than domestic funds with similar equity constraints.

**ASISA unit trust category:** Global – Multi Asset – Low Equity

## Fund objective and benchmark

The Fund aims to provide a high degree of capital stability (when measured in the foreign currency denominations of the underlying Orbis Funds), while producing long-term returns that are superior to foreign currency bank deposits. The Fund's benchmark is the simple average of the benchmarks of the underlying Orbis funds.

## How we aim to achieve the Fund's objective

The Fund invests only in the Optimal SA absolute return funds managed by our offshore investment partner, Orbis Investment Management Limited. Within the Optimal funds, Orbis uses in-house research to identify companies around the world whose shares can be purchased for less than Orbis' assessment of their long-term intrinsic value. This long-term perspective enables them to buy shares which are shunned by the stock market because of their unexciting or poor short-term prospects, but which are relatively attractively priced if one looks to the long term. This is the same approach as that used by Allan Gray to invest in South African equities, except that Orbis is able to choose from many more shares, listed internationally. The Orbis Optimal SA funds reduce most of their stock market risk by the use of exchange-traded derivative futures contracts. The Orbis Optimal SA funds will typically retain a small portion of their exposure to equity markets, but the level of exposure may be varied depending on Orbis' assessment of the potential returns on global stock markets relative to their risk of capital loss. The underlying funds' returns are therefore derived partly from their relatively low exposure to stock markets, partly from Orbis' selected share returns relative to those markets, and partly from foreign currency cash-equivalent returns. The Fund's currency exposure is actively managed both within the underlying Orbis funds and through our selection of Orbis funds.

## Suitable for those investors who

- Seek steady absolute returns ahead of those of cash measured in global currencies
- Wish to invest in international assets without having to personally expatriate rands
- Are comfortable with taking on the risk of currency fluctuation, but prefer little exposure to stock market risk
- Wish to use the Fund as a foreign absolute return 'building block' in a diversified multi-asset class portfolio

## Fund information on 30 November 2017

|                                  |            |
|----------------------------------|------------|
| Fund size                        | R1.3bn     |
| Number of units                  | 62 533 877 |
| Price (net asset value per unit) | R20.81     |
| Class                            | A          |

## Minimum investment amounts


|                                       |         |
|---------------------------------------|---------|
| Minimum lump sum per investor account | R20 000 |
| Additional lump sum                   | R500    |
| Minimum debit order*                  | R500    |

\*Only available to investors with a South African bank account.

- The simple average of the benchmarks of the underlying funds, performance as calculated by Allan Gray as at 30 November 2017.
- This is based on the latest numbers published by IRESS as at 31 October 2017.
- Maximum percentage decline over any period. The maximum rand drawdown occurred from 18 May 2016 to 24 March 2017 and maximum benchmark drawdown occurred from 18 January 2016 to 24 March 2017. Drawdown is calculated on the total return of the Fund/benchmark (i.e. including income).
- The percentage of calendar months in which the Fund produced a positive monthly return since inception.
- The standard deviation of the Fund's monthly return. This is a measure of how much an investment's return varies from its average over time.
- These are the highest or lowest consecutive 12-month returns since inception. This is a measure of how much the Fund and the benchmark returns have varied per rolling 12-month period. The Fund's highest annual return occurred during the 12 months ended 31 December 2013 and the benchmark's occurred during the 12 months ended 31 January 2016. The Fund's lowest annual return occurred during the 12 months ended 31 May 2017 and the benchmark's occurred during the 12 months ended 28 February 2017. All rolling 12-month figures for the Fund and the benchmark are available from our Client Service Centre on request.

## Performance net of all fees and expenses

Value of R10 invested at inception with all distributions reinvested



| % Returns                                  | Fund  |       | Benchmark <sup>1</sup> |       | CPI inflation <sup>2</sup> |      |
|--|-------|-------|------------------------|-------|----------------------------|------|
| Cumulative:                                | ZAR   | US\$  | ZAR                    | US\$  | ZAR                        | US\$ |
| Since inception (2 March 2010)             | 108.3 | 17.2  | 71.6                   | -3.5  | 49.1                       | 13.5 |
| Annualised:                                |       |       |                        |       |                            |      |
| Since inception (2 March 2010)             | 9.9   | 2.0   | 7.2                    | -0.5  | 5.4                        | 1.7  |
| Latest 5 years                             | 12.7  | 3.3   | 8.3                    | -0.7  | 5.5                        | 1.3  |
| Latest 3 years                             | 10.4  | 2.8   | 6.8                    | -0.6  | 5.3                        | 1.3  |
| Latest 2 years                             | 5.6   | 8.4   | 0.5                    | 3.2   | 5.6                        | 1.8  |
| Latest 1 year                              | 4.0   | 6.7   | 3.3                    | 5.9   | 4.8                        | 2.0  |
| Year-to-date (not annualised)              | 6.2   | 6.3   | 6.3                    | 6.4   | 4.5                        | 1.8  |
| Risk measures (since inception)            |       |       |                        |       |                            |      |
| Maximum drawdown <sup>3</sup>              | -18.9 | -14.1 | -26.0                  | -15.1 | n/a                        | n/a  |
| Percentage positive months <sup>4</sup>    | 50.5  | 52.7  | 47.3                   | 50.5  | n/a                        | n/a  |
| Annualised monthly volatility <sup>5</sup> | 13.8  | 6.5   | 13.1                   | 4.8   | n/a                        | n/a  |
| Highest annual return <sup>6</sup>         | 39.6  | 12.9  | 35.6                   | 9.4   | n/a                        | n/a  |
| Lowest annual return <sup>6</sup>          | -12.4 | -11.8 | -19.1                  | -11.6 | n/a                        | n/a  |

### Meeting the Fund objective

Since inception and over the latest five-year period, the Fund has outperformed its benchmark, although it should be noted that the returns on dollar and euro cash have been low over this period. There has been some volatility in the Fund's returns. The underlying funds' maximum drawdowns to date, in their reporting currencies, are 10% for the Orbis Optimal SA Dollar class and 7% for the Orbis Optimal SA Euro class.

### Income distributions for the last 12 months

|   |                    |
|---|--------------------|
| To the extent that income earned in the form of dividends and interest exceeds expenses in the Fund, the Fund will distribute any surplus annually. | <b>31 Dec 2016</b> |
| <b>Cents per unit</b>   | <b>0.0000</b>      |

### Annual management fee

Allan Gray does not charge an annual management fee but is paid a marketing and distribution fee by Orbis.

Orbis charges annual management fees within the underlying Orbis funds. Each fund's fee rate is calculated based on the fund's performance relative to its own benchmark. For more information please refer to the respective Orbis Funds' factsheets, which can be found at [www.allangray.co.za](http://www.allangray.co.za)

### Total expense ratio (TER) and Transaction costs

The annual management fees charged by Orbis are included in the TER. The TER is a measure of the actual expenses incurred by the Fund over a one and three-year period (annualised). Since Fund returns are quoted after deduction of these expenses, the TER should not be deducted from the published returns (refer to page 4 for further information). Transaction costs are disclosed separately.

| <b>TER and Transaction costs breakdown for the 1 and 3-year period ending 30 September 2017</b> | <b>1yr %</b> | <b>3yr %</b> |
|---|--------------|--------------|
| <b>Total expense ratio</b>  | <b>2.21</b>  | <b>1.54</b>  |
| Fee for benchmark performance   | 0.99         | 1.00         |
| Performance fees  | 1.14         | 0.45         |
| Other costs excluding transaction costs   | 0.08         | 0.09         |
| VAT   | 0.00         | 0.00         |
| <b>Transaction costs (including VAT)</b>  | <b>0.12</b>  | <b>0.13</b>  |
| <b>Total investment charge</b>  | <b>2.33</b>  | <b>1.67</b>  |

### Top 10 share holdings on 30 November 2017

| <b>Company</b>        | <b>% of portfolio</b> |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| XPO Logistics         | 4.6                   |
| Mitsubishi            | 3.3                   |
| Sumitomo              | 2.8                   |
| AbbVie                | 2.7                   |
| JD.com                | 2.7                   |
| NEXON                 | 2.6                   |
| Honda Motor           | 2.6                   |
| Wells Fargo & Company | 2.5                   |
| Sumitomo Mitsui       | 2.4                   |
| KB Financial          | 2.4                   |
| <b>Total (%)</b>      | <b>28.6</b>           |

### Asset allocation on 30 November 2017

|                    | <b>Total</b> | <b>North America</b> | <b>Europe</b> | <b>Japan</b> | <b>Asia ex-Japan</b> | <b>Other</b> |
|--------------------|--------------|----------------------|---------------|--------------|----------------------|--------------|
| Net equity         | 5.3          | -8.9                 | 1.5           | 3.6          | 7.7                  | 1.4          |
| Hedged equity      | 85.4         | 41.1                 | 11.9          | 20.4         | 9.2                  | 2.8          |
| Fixed interest     | 0.0          | 0.0                  | 0.0           | 0.0          | 0.0                  | 0.0          |
| Commodity-linked   | 0.0          | 0.0                  | 0.0           | 0.0          | 0.0                  | 0.0          |
| Net current assets | 9.3          | 0.0                  | 0.0           | 0.0          | 0.0                  | 9.3          |
| <b>Total</b>       | <b>100.0</b> | <b>32.2</b>          | <b>13.4</b>   | <b>24.0</b>  | <b>16.9</b>          | <b>13.5</b>  |

#### Currency exposure of the Orbis funds

| <b>Funds</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>62.1</b> | <b>34.4</b> | <b>0.0</b> | <b>2.6</b> | <b>0.9</b> |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|

Note: There may be slight discrepancies in the totals due to rounding.

### Fund allocation on 30 November 2017

| <b>Foreign absolute return funds</b> | <b>%</b>     |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|
| Orbis Optimal SA (US\$)              | 67.7         |
| Orbis Optimal SA (Euro)              | 32.3         |
| <b>Total (%)</b>                     | <b>100.0</b> |

Orbis aims to buy stocks that trade at a substantial discount to its estimate of intrinsic value. But what drives a stock to become undervalued? Often it is something idiosyncratic. Occasionally, however, mispricings can occur for reasons that are not specific to any single company, but instead stretch across areas that are connected by some common thread. Environments that contain these clustered mispricings are particularly exciting to Orbis, as they offer the potential to find especially attractive individual stocks within especially attractive parts of the market. This is the type of environment that exists today.

Consider the following example. Mitsubishi and Kikkoman are both Japanese companies. Historically they have traded at similar multiples, mainly as a result of comparable levels of underlying growth and profitability. Since 2010, however, their valuations have markedly diverged. Today, the price to tangible net asset value of Mitsubishi is at 1.0 times, which compares to Kikkoman at 2.9 times.

Unless one can find a good explanation for this valuation gap, it looks like a mispricing. Kikkoman is a food company, its main product being soy sauce. Mitsubishi is a conglomerate with stakes in a wide range of businesses. While Mitsubishi is harder to analyse, Orbis finds no acute reasons behind its low valuation. Similarly, one struggles to see any idiosyncratic reasons for Kikkoman's spectacular upward re-rating. If the mispricing is not idiosyncratic, what is driving such an unusual and extreme disconnect?

One clue is in the range of outcomes for the companies' earnings. Mitsubishi's future profitability is difficult to predict. The business is complex and many of its earnings streams are sensitive to exogenous variables. Kikkoman is more stable, its historical return on equity having varied by only 3% from year to year. In the current market environment, this predictability has had a tremendous influence on the companies' valuations.

To understand why, a concept from the world of fixed income – the 'term premium' – proves useful. Yields for long-term government bonds can be broken into a few parts: inflation expectations, the expected path of real interest rates and the term premium. The term premium can be thought of as the compensation offered to investors for taking on a long-dated risk. Logically, the term premium should always be positive, but today, term premiums in most developed markets are near zero, and some, astonishingly, are negative. A negative term premium implies that investors are paying for the privilege of taking on term risk. This looks like a real inefficiency – a mispricing. One culprit is quantitative easing (QE), the process where central banks buy bonds and other assets using newly printed money. Large price insensitive buyers of government bonds are bound to create price distortions. In this environment it makes sense for governments and companies to borrow long term, and this is what we have seen.

A negative term premium distorts the bond market, but it also influences equities. The cost of capital for a bond is easy to see – the yield. Equity also has a cost, which is the expected return investors demand to hold a stock. Because equity investments are less certain than the repayment on a bond, equities should offer a higher return than bonds. This additional compensation is the so-called equity risk premium. The riskier the company – the less predictable its cash flows – the bigger the equity risk premium will be.

Now one can hypothesise what's going on with Kikkoman and Mitsubishi. Kikkoman's fundamentals are more predictable, more 'bond-like'. The equity risk premium is smaller, so the term premium represents a larger chunk of the total cost of equity. Mitsubishi has greater uncertainty, so its equity risk premium is larger, and the term premium has a smaller impact on its valuation. As the term premium has fallen to absurdly low levels, Kikkoman's valuation has benefited enormously, while Mitsubishi has received far less of a boost.

This theme is emerging across all of Orbis' bottom-up research teams. In the 'QE era' since 2009, stocks with low fundamental uncertainty have benefited greatly from the falling term premium. This has pushed up their valuations when compared to shares perceived to have greater fundamental uncertainty.

Orbis goes where the bargains are, so the Optimal funds have a clustered exposure to 'shorter duration' equities with high levels of perceived uncertainty. Favoured holdings such as Wells Fargo, Rolls Royce, KB Financial, Sberbank of Russia, XPO Logistics and Mitsubishi all have these characteristics. On the other hand, Orbis continues to hold few stocks in predictable categories such as consumer staples. Predictability is not safety. At a high enough price, even the most reliable companies can be poor investments. And at a steep discount to intrinsic value, companies with harder-to-predict fundamentals can be very rewarding.

The Optimal funds typically retain modest long exposure to the stockmarkets they consider to be the most attractive based on their bottom-up research, and likewise, uses hedging to eliminate exposure to those stockmarkets where they believe assets are overvalued. The Fund retained a positive beta-adjusted exposure to the Japanese stockmarket and a significant net long exposure to Asian stockmarkets. By contrast, the Fund's beta-adjusted negative exposure to North American stockmarkets. There have been no material changes to the portfolio's currency exposures and changes to the top ten holdings were minimal.

**Adapted from Orbis commentaries contributed by by Graeme Forster**

**For the full commentary please see [www.orbisfunds.com](http://www.orbisfunds.com)**

**Fund manager quarterly  
commentary as at  
30 September 2017**

The availability of the Fund is subject to offshore capacity constraints. Please contact our Client Service Centre for further information about any constraints that may apply.

## Management Company

Allan Gray Unit Trust Management (RF) Proprietary Limited (the 'Management Company') is registered as a management company under the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002, in terms of which it operates 11 unit trust portfolios under the Allan Gray Unit Trust Scheme, and is supervised by the Financial Services Board ('FSB'). The Management Company is incorporated under the laws of South Africa and has been approved by the regulatory authority of Botswana to market its unit trusts in Botswana, however it is not supervised or licensed in Botswana. Allan Gray Proprietary Limited (the 'Investment Manager'), an authorised financial services provider, is the appointed Investment Manager of the Management Company and is a member of the Association for Savings & Investment South Africa (ASISA). The trustee/custodian of the Allan Gray Unit Trust Scheme is Rand Merchant Bank, a division of FirstRand Bank Limited. The trustee/custodian can be contacted at RMB Custody and Trustee Services: Tel: +27 (0)87 736 1732 or [www.rmb.co.za](http://www.rmb.co.za)

## Performance

Collective Investment Schemes in Securities (unit trusts or funds) are generally medium- to long-term investments. The value of units may go down as well as up and past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. Movements in exchange rates may also cause the value of underlying international investments to go up or down. The Management Company does not provide any guarantee regarding the capital or the performance of the Fund. Performance figures are provided by the Investment Manager and are for lump sum investments with income distributions reinvested. Where annualised performance is mentioned, this refers to the average return per year over the period. Actual investor performance may differ as a result of the investment date, the date of reinvestment and dividend withholding tax.

## Fund mandate

The Fund may be closed to new investments at any time in order to be managed according to its mandate. Unit trusts are traded at ruling prices and can engage in borrowing and scrip lending. The Fund may borrow up to 10% of its market value to bridge insufficient liquidity.

## Unit price

Unit trust prices are calculated on a net asset value basis, which is the total market value of all assets in the Fund including any income accruals and less any permissible deductions from the Fund divided by the number of units in issue. Forward pricing is used and fund valuations take place at approximately 16:00 each business day.

Purchase and redemption requests must be received by the Management Company by 14:00 each business day to receive that day's price. Unit trust prices are available daily on [www.allangray.co.za](http://www.allangray.co.za)

## Fees

Permissible deductions may include management fees, brokerage, Securities Transfer Tax (STT), auditor's fees, bank charges and trustee fees. A schedule of fees, charges and maximum commissions is available on request from Allan Gray.

## Total expense ratio (TER) and Transaction costs

The total expense ratio (TER) is the annualised percentage of the Fund's average assets under management that has been used to pay the Fund's actual expenses over the past one and three-year periods. The TER includes the annual management fees that have been charged (both the fee at benchmark and any performance component charged), VAT and other expenses like audit and trustee fees. Transaction costs (including brokerage, Securities Transfer Tax [STT], STRATE and FSB Investor Protection Levy and VAT thereon) are shown separately. Transaction costs are a necessary cost in administering the Fund and impact Fund returns. They should not be considered in isolation as returns may be impacted by many other factors over time including market returns, the type of financial product, the investment decisions of the investment manager and the TER. Since Fund returns are quoted after the deduction of these expenses, the TER and Transaction costs should not be deducted again from published returns. As unit trust expenses vary, the current TER cannot be used as an indication of future TERs. A higher TER ratio does not necessarily imply a poor return, nor does a low TER imply a good return. Instead, when investing, the investment objective of the Fund should be aligned with the investor's objective and compared against the performance of the Fund. The TER and other funds' TERs should then be used to evaluate whether the Fund performance offers value for money. The sum of the TER and Transaction costs is shown as the Total investment charge.

## Fund of funds

A fund of funds is a unit trust that invests in other unit trusts, which charge their own fees. Allan Gray does not charge any additional fees in its funds of funds.

## Foreign exposure

The Fund invests in foreign funds managed by Orbis Investment Management Limited, our offshore investment partner.

## Important information for investors

### Need more information?

You can obtain additional information about your proposed investment from Allan Gray free of charge either via our website [www.allangray.co.za](http://www.allangray.co.za) or via our Client Service Centre on **0860 000 654**.